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Ethics of Human Enhancement: An Executive 
Summary 
Fritz Allhoff • Patrick Lin • Jesse Steinberg 
With multi-year funding from the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), a team 
of researchers has just released a comprehensive report detailing ethical issues 
arising from human enhancement (Allhoff et al. 2009). While we direct the 
interested reader to that (much longer) report, we also thank the editors of this 
journal for the invitation to provide an executive summary thereof. This summary 
highlights key results from each section of that report and does so in a self-standing 
way; in other words, this summary presupposes no familiarity with the report and 
offers the opportunity to gain quick familiarity with its most central ﬁndings. 
What Is Enhancement? 
‘‘Man is the only creature that refuses to be what he is’’ (Camus 1951, p. 11). Homo 
sapiens has been such a proliﬁc species, simply because we are relentlessly 
proﬁcient at adapting to our environment. At the most basic level, we have won 
control over ﬁre and tools to forge a new world around us: we build shelter and 
weave clothes to repel the brutal elements, and we raise animals and crops for 
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predictability in our meals. With intellect and resourcefulness, we are better able to 
survive this world. 
However, it is not just the world around us that we desire to change. Since the 
beginning of history, we also have wanted to become more than human, to become 
Homo superior. From the godlike command of Gilgamesh, to the lofty ambitions of 
Icarus, to the preternatural strength of Beowulf, to the mythical skills of Shaolin 
monks, and to various shamans and shapeshifters throughout the world’s cultural 
history, we have dreamt—and still dream—of transforming ourselves to overcome 
our all-too-human frailties and limitations. 
In practice, this means that we improve our minds through education, disciplined 
thinking, and meditation. We improve our bodies with a sound diet and physical 
exercise, and we train with weapons and techniques to defend ourselves from those 
who would conspire to kill. But today, something seems to be different. With 
ongoing work to unravel the mysteries of our minds and bodies, coupled with the art 
and science of emerging technologies, we are near the beginning of the Human 
Enhancement Revolution. 
Now we are no longer limited to ‘‘natural’’ methods to enhance ourselves or to 
merely wield tools such as a hammer or binoculars or a calculator. We are beginning 
to incorporate technology within our very bodies, which may hold moral 
signiﬁcance that we need to consider. These technologies promise great beneﬁts 
for humanity—such as increased productivity and creativity, longer lives, greater 
serenity, stronger bodies and minds, and more—though there is a question of 
whether these things translate into happier lives, which many see as the point of it 
all (President’s Council on Bioethics 2003; Persaud 2006). 
As examples of emerging technologies in the last year or so, several imaginative 
inventions in particular are closing the gap even more between science ﬁction and 
the real world. Scientists have conceptualized an electronic-packed contact lens that 
may provide the wearer with telescopic and night vision or act as an omnipresent 
digital monitor to receive and relay information (Parviz et al. 2008). Another 
innovation is a touch display designed to be implanted just under the skin that would 
activate special tattoo ink on one’s arm to form images, such as telephone-number 
keys to punch or even a video to watch (Mielke 2008). Together with ever-shrinking 
computing devices, we appear to be moving closer to cybernetic organisms (or 
‘‘cyborgs’’); that is, where machines are integrated within our bodies or at least into 
our clothing in the nearer-term. Forget about Pocket PCs, mobile phones, GPS 
devices, and other portable gadgets; we might soon be able to communicate and 
access those capabilities without having to carry any external device, thus raising 
our productivity, efﬁciency, response time, and other desirable measures—in short, 
enabling us to even better survive our world. 
Technology is clearly a game-changing ﬁeld. The invention of such things as the 
printing press, gunpowder, automobiles, computers, vaccines, and so on, has 
profoundly changed the world, for the better we hope. But at the same time, they 
have also led to unforeseen consequences, or perhaps consequences that might have 
been foreseen and addressed had we bothered to investigate them. Least of all, they 
have disrupted the status quo, which is not necessarily a terrible thing in and of 
itself; but unnecessary and dramatic disruptions, such as mass displacements of 
workers or industries, have real human costs. As we will discuss, this may well be 
the case with human enhancement technologies, enabled by advances in nanotech-
nology, micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS), genetic engineering, robotics, 
cognitive science, information technology, pharmacology, and other ﬁelds (Roco 
and Bainbridge 2003).1 
The NSF report is an examination of many social and ethical issues surrounding 
human enhancement technologies. For example, concerning the issue of whether 
such technologies ought to be regulated or otherwise restricted, one position is that 
(more than minimal) regulation would hinder personal freedom or autonomy, 
infringing on some natural or political right to improve our own bodies, minds, and 
lives as we see ﬁt (Naam 2005; Bailey 2005; Harris 2007; Allhoff et al. 2010). 
Others, however, advocate strong regulation—and even a research moratorium—to 
protect against unintended effects on society, such as the presumably-undesirable 
creation of a new class of enhanced persons who could outwit, outplay, and outlast 
‘‘normal’’ or unenhanced persons for jobs, in schools, at sporting contests, and so on 
(Fukuyama 2002, 2006; Friends of the Earth 2006). Still others seek a sensible 
middle path between stringent regulation and individual liberty (Hughes 2004; 
Greely 2005). 
No matter where one is aligned on this issue, the human enhancement debate is a 
deeply passionate and personal one, striking at the heart of what it means to be 
human. Some see it as a way to fulﬁll or even transcend our potential; others see it 
as a darker path towards becoming Frankenstein’s monster. To help untangle this 
debate, the NSF report is comprised of a list of questions and answers, starting with 
background issues and moving to speciﬁc concerns, including: freedom & 
autonomy, health & safety, fairness & equity, societal disruption, and human 
dignity. The report does not represent an exhaustive discussion of these issues; 
indeed, many of these questions would require a book-length treatise for any 
satisfying answer. Rather, the report is intended as a broad survey of the human 
enhancement landscape and its main contours, not its more intricate rabbit holes and 
subtler terrain, as other and future investigations will surely explore. 
Deﬁnitions and Distinctions 
Strictly speaking, ‘‘human enhancement’’ includes any activity by which we 
improve our bodies, minds, or abilities—things we do to enhance our well-being 
(Lin and Allhoff 2008). But it is tempting to think that ‘‘human enhancement’’ is 
about boosting our capabilities beyond the species-typical level or statistically-
normal range of functioning for an individual (Daniels 2000). Consider the 
following illustrative examples. As it concerns the mind, taking Ritalin to treat 
attention-deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is aimed at correcting the deﬁcit; 
but taken by otherwise-normal students to enable them to focus better in studying 
1 For an overview of ethical and social issues of nanotechnology beyond its role in human enhancement, 
see Allhoff and Lin 2006; Lin and Allhoff 2007; Allhoff et al. 2007; Allhoff and Lin 2008; and Allhoff 
et al. 2010. 
for exams is a form of human enhancement. And where reading a book may indeed 
make you more knowledgeable, it does not make you so much smarter than most 
everyone else or push your intellect past natural limits; on the other hand, a 
computer chip implanted into your brain that gives you direct access to Google or 
spreadsheets would provide mental capabilities beyond the species-typical level. 
Since, strictly speaking, human enhancements seem to include such activities as 
reading a book and eating vegetables it might appear that these ‘‘natural’’ 
enhancements are ethically unproblematic. It would be tempting to draw a line here 
in the human enhancement debate such that ‘‘artiﬁcial’’ or ‘‘unnatural’’ enhance-
ments require moral evaluation. However, this approach is problematic. First, there 
appears to be vagueness as to what should count as ‘‘natural.’’ In addition, the 
distinction between natural and artiﬁcial might objectionably rest on dubious 
theological or teleological premises (e.g., that we have God-given goals or limits in 
life such that living to 300 would be profanely unnatural or in violation of God’s 
will). 
One might be tempted by the thought that the internal-external distinction is 
morally signiﬁcant insofar as one might think that human enhancements that are 
internal are morally questionable, whereas those that are external are not. In other 
words, the use of tools is perfectly moral, but incorporating tools as part of our 
bodies is morally questionable. However, it could also be maintained that a neural 
implant that gives access to Google and the rest of the online world does not seem to 
be different in kind to using a laptop computer or Pocket PC to access the same. So 
why should it matter that we are imbedding computing power into our heads rather 
than carrying the same capabilities with us by way of external devices? 
Context and the Moral Status of Enhancement 
What counts as an enhancement and whether it is morally relevant seems to be 
context-dependent. For example, we can imagine a society in which strict equality is 
the over-arching value, trumping individual rights to life, liberty, knowledge, and so 
on; thus immunizing a person from a serious disease might be prohibited in such a 
world so to not upset egalitarian values or disrupt social institutions that strongly 
rely on a certain range of life expectancy, e.g., a social security system. Another 
example: freely burning fossil fuels was less morally signiﬁcant in 1910 than it is in 
2010, given the current state of global warming, pollution, and their causes and 
effects. Therefore, context matters, and so it seems premature to say that all 
enhancements are morally worrisome, irrespective of context; but it is also 
premature to declare all of them to be unproblematic, especially at a start of debate 
exactly about those questions. 
In this regard, we might also make an argument that strict equality is not morally 
required in the ﬁrst place, given the natural and manageable range of variations in 
our species; but if some future vaccine takes us well beyond this ‘‘normal’’ range, 
e.g., super-longevity or super-strength, our social systems (including law and public 
policy) are not equipped to account for those extra abilities, thereby raising latent 
issues of equity, fairness, access, etc. Similarly, we can imagine a world in which 
cognitive enhancements no longer hold much controversy as they do today, after 
social structures in the future have adapted to account for them—just like, e.g., 
steroid use in sports might no longer be an ethical issue (perhaps only a health issue) 
if we create separate competitions for the enhanced as well as unenhanced. Again, 
context seems to matter. 
Freedom and Autonomy 
There is perhaps no greater value, at least in democracies, than the cherished 
concept of freedom, loosely deﬁned here as the absence of constraints. But because 
freedom is central to the issue of human enhancement, it adds much fuel to the 
impassioned debate. Pro-enhancement advocates have argued against regulating 
enhancements on the grounds that it would infringe on our fundamental ability to 
choose how we want to live our own lives (Naam 2005; Bailey 2005; Harris 2007). 
Or, in other words, if enhancing our bodies does not hurt anyone (other than 
possibly ourselves), then why should we be prevented from doing so? This is a 
common objection—arguing especially against governmental intervention—to any 
number of proposals that involve regulation, from hiring practices to home 
improvements to school clothing, and so on. 
Though freedom may be viewed in democracies as a ‘‘sacred cow’’ that ought not 
be corralled, the reality is that we do not have complete freedom in the areas of life 
that we think we do anyway. As examples, freedom of the press and freedom of 
speech do not protect the individual from charges of libel, slander, or inciting panic 
by yelling ‘‘Fire!’’ in a crowded theater; our privacy expectations quietly give way 
to security measures, such as searches on our property and persons at airports or 
eavesdropping on our communications; and even ancestral homes built by the hands 
of one’s forefathers could be unilaterally seized (and demolished) by the state under 
eminent domain laws. This is to say that whatever rights we have also imply 
responsibilities and exist within some particular political system. Therefore, it is not 
unreasonable to expect or deﬁne certain limits for those rights, especially where 
they conﬂict with other rights and obligations. 
Maximal freedom is a hallmark of a laissez-faire or minimal state, but a 
democratic society is not compelled to endorse such a stance, as some political 
philosophers have suggested (e.g., Nozick 1974). Nor would reasonable people 
necessarily want unrestricted freedom anyway, e.g., no restrictions or background 
checks for gun ownership. Even the most liberal democracy today understands the 
value of regulations as a way to enhance our freedom. For instance, our economic 
system is not truly a ‘‘free market’’: though we may advocate freedom in general, 
regulations exist not only to protect our rights, but also to create an orderly process 
that greases the economic wheel, accelerating both innovations and transactions. As 
a simpler example, by imposing laws on trafﬁc, we can actually increase our 
freedom: by driving forward on only one side of the road, we can be (more) assured 
that we will not be a victim of a head-on collision, which makes driving faster a 
more sensible proposition. 
There is another sense, related to free will, in which cognitive enhancements may 
be infringing: if an enhancement, such as a mood-altering drug or neural implant, 
interferes with or alters our deliberative process, then it is an open question whether 
or not we are truly acting freely while under the inﬂuence of the enhancement. For 
instance, a ‘‘citizen chip’’ embedded in the brain might cause us to be unswervingly 
patriotic and hold different values than we would otherwise. Further, external 
pressure from peers, employers, competitors, national security, and others to accept 
a particular enhancement also may unduly inﬂuence one’s decision making (Guston 
et al. 2007). Such considerations have some obvious moral implications. 
Fairness and Equity 
It is certainly understandable that one might desire or even feel pressure to enhance 
one’s self or children, but it is important to note the following: advantages gained by 
enhanced persons also imply a relative disadvantage for the unenhanced, whether in 
sports, employment opportunities, academic performance, or any other area. That is 
to say, fairness is another value to consider in the debate. A related worry is that the 
wealthy would be the ﬁrst adopters of human enhancement technologies, given that 
they can best afford such innovations (like LASIK eye surgery), thus creating an 
even wider gap between the haves and the have-nots (McKibben 2004). 
In considering the issue of fairness, we need to be careful not to conﬂate it with 
equity. Under most economic theories, fairness does not require that we need to 
close the gap entirely between economic classes, even when justice is deﬁned as 
fairness (Rawls 1971; for an application of Rawls to enhancement, see Allhoff 
2005). Indeed, there are good reasons to think that we want some gap to exist, for 
example, to provide incentives for innovations, in order to move up the economic 
ladder, and to allow ﬂexibility in a workforce to ﬁll vacancies and perform a wide 
range of tasks. At least some competition seems to be desirable, especially when 
resources to be allocated are limited. 
Thus, inequality itself is not so much the point, though any poverty or decline in 
welfare related to increased inequality may be a serious concern. We do not want 
people to stop striving to improve their own lives, even if the situation for others is 
not improved at the same time or ever. And natural advantages and inequities 
already exist without moral issues anyway; Hobbes recognized that these organic 
differences did not give any individual or group of individuals so much net 
advantage that they would be invulnerable to the ‘‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short’’ conditions that mark human life (Hobbes 1651, p. I.xiii.9). 
If human enhancement technologies develop as predicted, they can afford us a 
tremendous advantage in life; e.g., over others in a competition for resources, so 
much so that it overstretches the natural range of equality to the point where 
inequality becomes a more salient issue. This is where the gap between enhanced 
and unenhanced persons may be too wide to bridge, making the latter into dinosaurs 
in a hypercompetitive world. If we assume that the beneﬁts of being an enhanced 
person must be largely paid from the welfare of others, e.g., a job-gain by one 
person is a job-loss by another. Since the others are now at a relative disadvantage, 
this may further impoverish the unenhanced, which may limit their access to such 
things as healthcare, legal representation, political inﬂuence, and so on. 
Social Disruptions 
Fairness and equality are not just theoretical values, but they have practical effects. 
Gross inequality itself, whether fair or not, can motivate the worse-off masses to 
revolt against a state or system. But societal disruption need not be so extreme to be 
taken seriously. Entire institutions today—as well as the lack thereof—are based on 
a speciﬁc range of abilities and rough equality of natural assets. Sports, for instance, 
would change dramatically, if enhanced persons are permitted to compete to the 
clear disadvantage of unenhanced athletes, smashing their previous records. (This is 
not to say that sports should ban enhanced competitors, only that doing so would 
have a real, signiﬁcant affect on careers and expend valuable resources to adjust 
sporting programs and contests.) 
Other institutions and systems include economic, privacy, communications, 
pensions, security, and many other sectors of society. For instance, if life-extension 
technologies can increase our average lifespan by 20 years—let alone the 
100 ? years predicted by some futurists (Kurzweil 2005; de Grey 2007), and 
assuming that the extra 20 years will be a good life, not one bogged down with 
illness and diminishing productivity that afﬂict many elderly today—then we would 
need to radically adjust retirement programs: do we move the retirement age to 85, 
which has negative consequences for job-seekers such as new tenure-track academic 
faculty, or increase contributions to pension plans, which puts pressure on 
household budgets and employers? Or both? Also, assuming birth rates do not 
decline (which causes problems of its own), longer lives will mean more pressure on 
resources such as energy and food. 
Some scenarios that may cause social disruption include: a job candidate with a 
neural implant that enables better data retention and faster information processing 
would consistently beat out unenhanced candidates; a person with super-human 
hearing or sight could circumvent existing privacy protections and expectations by 
easily and undetectably eavesdropping or spying on others; more students (and 
professors) using Ritalin may grab admission or tenure at all the best universities, 
and so on. 
Human Dignity and the Good Life 
The ﬁercest resistance to human enhancement technologies is perhaps a concern 
about their effect on ‘‘human dignity’’ and what it means to be human (President’s 
Council on Bioethics 2003; Sandel 2007). For instance, does the desire for 
enhancement show ingratitude for what we have and (further) enable an attitude of 
unquenchable dissatisfaction with one’s life? Some researchers suggest that 
discontent is hardwired into the genetic makeup of humans (Hill 2006; Woodall 
2007), which is why we constantly innovate, strive to achieve and gain more, etc. 
However, even if this is true, it does not seem to be so much an argument to promote 
human enhancement technologies, but more a worry that those technologies are not 
the panacea or Holy Grail of happiness we might believe them to be. That is, we will 
still be dissatisﬁed with ourselves no matter how much we enhance ourselves (unless, 
of course, we somehow eradicate that part of our DNA that causes discontent). 
Would human enhancement technologies hinder moral development? Many 
believe that ‘‘soul-making’’ is impossible without struggle (Hick 1966), and 
achievements ring hollow without sacriﬁce or effort (President’s Council on 
Bioethics 2003); so if technology makes life and competitions easier, then we may 
lose opportunities to feed and grow our moral character. On the other hand, compare 
our lives today with pre-Internet days: increased connectivity to friends, work, 
information, etc. is often a double-edged proposition that also increases stress and 
decreases free time. This, then, raises the related concern of whether enhancement 
technologies will actually make our lives happier. (If the research mentioned above 
about discontent in our genes is accurate, then we might have a psychobiological 
reason to think not.) 
Is the frailty of the human condition necessary to best appreciate life? There is 
something romantic about the notion of being mortal and fallible. But with existing 
pharmacology, we could eliminate the emotion of sadness today, and work is 
continuing on drugs that repress memories; but it is not clear that sadness (at least in 
the normal range, as opposed to clinical depression) is a ‘‘pathology’’ we should want 
to eliminate, rather than a human experience that we should preserve (President’s 
Council on Bioethics 2003). Other critics have suggested that life could be too long, 
leading to boredom after one’s life-goals are achieved (e.g., Williams 1973). 
Finally, there might be concern that we are playing God with world-changing 
technologies, which is presumably bad (Peters 2007). But what exactly counts as 
‘‘playing God’’, and why is that morally wrong; i.e., where exactly is the 
proscription in religious scripture? If we deﬁne the concept as manipulating nature, 
then we all have been guilty of that since the ﬁrst man picked up a stick. Making 
life-and-death decisions is a plausible candidate as a deﬁnition, but then physicians 
as well as soldiers (even in holy wars?) could be accused of this charge. 
Rights and Obligations 
Rights can be divided into two broad classes: a class of human rights, sometimes 
called ‘‘natural rights’’, and a class of more conventional rights based on the speciﬁc 
customs, roles, and laws of a society. Examples of the former are famously listed in 
the American Declaration of Independence: ‘‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, 
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.’’ 
The right to enhancement is not speciﬁcally included in this list or in other familiar 
lists of human rights. But it could be argued that a right of enhancement is a right 
derived from some or all of the human rights like those listed in the Declaration of 
Independence. Humans should be able to exercise their right to enhancements to the 
extent that it promotes their life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness. 
However, this at most would make a right to enhancement a prima facie right 
because human rights themselves, though fundamental, can conﬂict and are 
susceptible to modiﬁcation and qualiﬁcation. One’s right to liberty, for example, 
does not automatically permit infringement on the rights of others. Rights frequently 
trump one another in our considerations about which action is correct. But rights can 
also be trumped by extremely harmful consequences. Therefore, even if the right to 
enhancement is regarded as a derived human right, its application in a particular 
situation could be challenged on the grounds that it infringes on the rights of others 
or that its exercise would lead to extreme harm. 
The right to enhancement can also be regarded as conventional. ‘‘Conventional’’ 
does not mean ‘‘arbitrary’’ but ‘‘established by general agreement or practice.’’ We 
can make laws, for example, that allow some enhancements and laws that prohibit 
others. How justiﬁed such conventional rights or prohibitions are depends upon how 
good the reasons are for them. We might easily justify the use of nanodevices that 
patrol our bodies for cancerous outbreaks. We would prohibit the use of 
nanodevices that would give humans a burst of intelligence followed by likely 
seizures and strokes. 
Policy and Law 
Given the preceding discussion, it should be clear that human enhancement is more 
than just about the individual’s freedom or autonomy, but there are plausibly 
negative consequences to others and society that need to be considered. Or at least 
an argument needs to be made that freedom/autonomy trumps all other values, but 
such a position seems unacceptably dogmatic. These issues point to the policy 
dilemma of whether we should regulate or restrict on human enhancement 
technologies, so as to prevent or mitigate some of the negative impacts. Three 
answers suggest themselves: (1) no restrictions, (2) some restrictions, or (3) a 
moratorium or full ban. 
A moratorium seems unrealistic to the extent that a worldwide one would be 
needed to truly stem the use of human enhancement technologies, and that no 
worldwide moratorium on anything has yet to work, including on (alleged) attempts 
to clone a human being. A local moratorium would send patients to ‘‘back-alley’’ 
enhancement clinics or to more liberal regions of the world, as is the case with 
‘‘cosmetic-surgery vacations’’ in which those medical procedures are less expensive 
in other nations. Further, a ban on enhancement research seems much too 
premature—an overreaction to perceived, future risks—as well as a real threat to 
therapy-related research today. 
On the other side of the spectrum, the idea of having no restrictions on human 
enhancement technologies seems to be reckless or at least unjustiﬁably optimistic, 
given that there are plausible risks. As pointed out earlier, complete freedom or 
autonomy may be a recipe for disaster and chaos in any case; we do not want to 
grant the right to yell ‘‘Fire!’’ in a crowded venue or the right for dangerous felons 
to own ﬁrearms. 
So what about ﬁnding middle ground with some non-Draconian regulations? 
Critics have argued that any regulation would be imperfect and likely ineffectual, 
much like laws against contraband or prostitution (Naam 2005); but it is not clear 
that eliminating these laws would improve the situation, all things considered. Also, 
as a society, we still believe we ought to at least try to solve social ills, even if we 
cannot ultimately ﬁx the entire problem, e.g., we cannot stop any given crime from 
ever occurring, yet we still have laws against such acts. And even if there are 
practical reasons to not pursue regulations, would that send the wrong message; e.g., 
to children, that we support enhancement without reservations? 
The issue of regulation will surely not be settled here, nor do we intend it to be. 
Yet it is important to keep in mind that the human enhancement debate is not just a 
theoretical discussion about ethics, but has bearing on the real world with policy 
decisions that may affect not just the would-be enhanced, but also researchers, 
manufacturers, social institutions, as well as our ideals of freedom and human 
dignity (Lin 2007). 
Conclusion 
This has been a short review of a number of major questions in the ethics debate on 
human enhancement. An impressive array of technologies is driving the urgency of 
this debate, from familiar drugs (e.g., steroids, modaﬁnil, Ritalin) to fantastic 
visions of a cybernetic future. No one knows which visions—utopian, dystopian, or 
pedestrian—ultimately will be realized. But insofar as there are good reasons to 
think that many of these visions are plausible, it seems prudent to at least begin a 
conversation about the many ethical, legal, social, and political issues associated 
with human enhancement, especially since ethics seems to historically lag (far) 
behind technology and other quickly-evolving events. By planning ahead, we can be 
better prepared to enact legislation or regulation as deemed ﬁt. 
The NSF report represents a disinterested, sensible middle path in presenting the 
various sides of each issue, given the early stage of this debate, though clearly there 
are passionate and opposing forces engaged in this international struggle for clarity 
and policy. An increasing ﬂow of thoughtful literature exists (e.g., Savulescu and 
Bostrom 2009), and we expect the arguments to continue for many more years— 
proving the prediction that human enhancement ethics will be one of the most 
important debates in science and society is this brave new century. 
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